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Digitally Unknown: Why the Ninth Circuit Should
Wish to Remain Anonymous in In re Anonymous
Online Speakers
I. INTRODUCTION
Anonymous speech has a long and rich history in the United
States. For example, the Federalist Papers, drafted by James
Madison, John Jay, and Alexander Hamilton, were published under
the pseudonym “Publius.”1 The value of the Federalist Papers to civil
dialogue is undisputed, and it is likely that they would not have had
the same effect had the drafters been forced to disclose their
identities.2 As the Supreme Court has stated, “It is plain that
anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most constructive
purposes.”3 Some of these purposes are to avoid chilling effects on
freedom of expression4 and to allow an unpopular speaker to speak
without others prejudging her message.5 Nearly two centuries after
the Federalist Papers were published, the Supreme Court embodied
in the First Amendment this long-respected right to speak
anonymously.6
The anonymous speech doctrine, as it has come to be known,
has remained vibrant in the United States—protecting individuals
from laws that would require them to disclose their identities on
handbills7 and campaign literature.8 Since the advent of the Internet,
the anonymous speech doctrine has taken on an increasingly
prominent role in society because anyone with Internet access can

1. E. Norman Veasey, What Would Madison Think? The Irony of the Twists and Turns of
Federalism, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35, 38 (2009).
2. See Jay Krasovec, Comment, Cyberspace: The Final Frontier, for Regulation?, 31
AKRON L. REV. 101, 127 n.116 (1997) (citing the importance of anonymous speech in the
formation of our country and recognizing that “the ability to speak anonymously often
provides a safe haven for those who wish to express unpopular views”).
3. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960).
4. Id. at 64.
5. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995).
6. Talley, 362 U.S. at 65.
7. Id. at 60.
8. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357 (1995).
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become a town crier or a pamphleteer.9 While this increased access to
a figurative pulpit ought to be celebrated in the marketplace of ideas,
anonymous online speech also brings new challenges and problems.
For example, the ease of access to an audience and the general
permanence of content posted online create numerous opportunities
for individuals to act maliciously behind the cloak of Internet
anonymity. Thus, piercing the cloak of anonymity to identify
anonymous speakers has been litigated with increasing frequency
since the advent of the Internet.10
In early 2011, the Ninth Circuit addressed the conflict of
anonymous speech in the Internet context in In re Anonymous
Online Speakers.11 This case presented the issue whether the veil of
anonymity could be pierced for five speakers’ allegedly defamatory
statements that were anonymously posted to various blogs.12 In
resolving this issue, the Ninth Circuit had to decide whether the
circumstances warranted issuing writs of mandamus either to protect
the speakers’ identities or to require their disclosure in discovery.13
While the court ultimately declined to issue either of the writs
(leaving the district court ruling unaltered),14 the court’s analysis
raises two key questions. First, does anonymous online speech
deserve more or less protection than traditional anonymous speech?
Second, what standard should courts apply to balance the interests of
disclosing the anonymous defamers’ identities with maintaining the
First Amendment protections afforded to anonymous speakers?
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Anonymous
Online Speakers answered both of these questions erroneously. First,
the court suggested that anonymous online speech deserves less
protection than other anonymous speech because the Internet’s
speed increases the likelihood that harm or lies will be perpetuated.15
9. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
10. See, e.g., Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D. Conn. 2008); Sony Music
Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re Subpoena Duces
Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26 (2000), rev’d on other grounds, Am. Online v.
Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
11. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011).
12. Id. at 1171.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 1176 (citing with approval the district court’s recognition that the Internet
has “great potential for irresponsible, malicious, and harmful communication”).

446

BBRANDON.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

445

3/20/2012 11:36 AM

Digitally Unknown

The court’s approach is problematic because it directly cuts against
Supreme Court precedent suggesting that anonymous online speech
should not be treated differently than other anonymous speech.16
Second, despite pointing out the inconsistent standards used by
other courts, the Ninth Circuit failed to articulate which standard
should govern whether to disclose an anonymous speaker’s identity
in pretrial discovery.17 The Ninth Circuit passed up a valuable
opportunity to resolve some confusion—at least for the courts within
its jurisdiction—with there being no direct Supreme Court precedent
and numerous standards used by different courts.
This Note proceeds as follows. Part II provides the facts and
procedural history of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Anonymous
Online Speakers. Part III summarizes the three main areas of analysis
in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion. Part IV analyzes two major problems
with the Ninth Circuit’s decision. It argues that the court should
have treated anonymous online speech the same as other forms of
anonymous online speakers’ identities, preferably the prima facie case
standard. Finally, Part V offers a brief conclusion.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Quixtar, a multilevel-marketing business run by independent
business owners, distributes a variety of products to consumers
(cosmetics, nutritional supplements, etc.).18 TEAM, LLC, founded
by two Quixtar independent business owners, provided support
materials, gave business trainings, and even sold products to
Quixtar.19 In 2007, problems arose between Quixtar and TEAM,
resulting in several lawsuits between the two companies.20 In one of
these lawsuits, Quixtar alleged that TEAM conducted a smear
campaign against Quixtar in order to encourage Quixtar’s
independent business owners to leave “and join a competing
multilevel marketing company affiliated with TEAM.”21 This alleged
“campaign” consisted of at least five anonymous statements posted

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Part IV.A.
See In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1174–78.
Id. at 1171–72.
Id. at 1172.
Id.
Id.
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on different blogs.22 These statements formed the basis for Quixtar’s
claims against TEAM for “tortious interference with existing
contracts and with advantageous business relations.”23
The case became interesting, however, when Quixtar deposed
TEAM’s Online Content Manager, Dickie.24 Dickie refused to
answer questions about the identity of some of the anonymous
online speakers.25 After examining the statements made on each
blog, the district court ordered Dickie to testify about the identity of
three of the speakers.26 To prevent this testimony, the anonymous
speakers filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to block the court’s
order.27 Quixtar opposed the petition and cross-petitioned for a writ
of mandamus to compel the court to require Dickie to testify about
the other two speakers.28
III. THE COURT’S DECISION
The Ninth Circuit originally ruled on the petition for writ of
mandamus in July 2010,29 but the court withdrew its opinion and
issued a new one in January 2011.30 This later opinion denied both
Quixtar’s and the anonymous speakers’ petitions for writs of
mandamus, ultimately leaving the district court decision
untouched.31 The Ninth Circuit’s analysis focused on three major
elements: (1) general First Amendment doctrine and the various
levels of protection given to different types of speech;32 (2) how a
22. Id. The blogs were associated with TEAM, Quixtar, or multilevel marketing in some
way, such as the “Integrity is TEAM” blog and the “IBO Rebellion” blog (referring to the
way Quixtar ran its business through “Independent Business Owners”). Id. at 1171–72.
23. Id. at 1172.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 611 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 2010), withdrawn and
superseded by 661 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011).
30. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1168. The most substantial
difference between the withdrawn opinion and the one that superseded it is that in the latter,
the court explicitly declined to decide if the speech at issue constituted commercial speech.
Compare In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 611 F.3d at 661, with In re Anonymous Online
Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1177.
31. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1171.
32. Id. at 1172–73.
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petition for mandamus heightens the standard of review in First
Amendment contexts;33 and (3) the standard that courts use to
evaluate whether to allow discovery of anonymous speakers’
identities.34 The Ninth Circuit ultimately held that, even if the
district court had applied the wrong standard in deciding whether to
allow the speakers’ identities to be discoverable, that error would not
constitute “clear error” sufficient to issue a writ of mandamus for
either party.35
First, the Ninth Circuit summarized First Amendment
jurisprudence by articulating the contours of various levels of speech
protection. The court gave due deference to the principle that “an
author’s decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions
concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is
an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First
Amendment.”36 The court also added that “online speech stands on
the same footing as other speech—there is ‘no basis for qualifying
the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied’ to
online speech.”37 The Ninth Circuit used the Supreme Court’s
language from Reno v. ACLU38 and appeared to follow precedent.
But the court actually undermined precedent because its application
to anonymous online speech may strip the speech of much of its
protection.39 The Ninth Circuit appeared to admit that online speech
did not deserve as much protection as other anonymous speech
when it approved the district court’s conclusion that the Internet has
“great potential for irresponsible, malicious, and harmful
communication and that particularly in the age of the Internet, the
speed and power of internet technology makes it difficult for the
truth to ‘catch up’ to the lie.”40

33. Id. at 1174–75, 1177.
34. Id. at 1174–78.
35. Id. at 1176–78.
36. Id. at 1173 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342
(1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Id. (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)).
38. Reno, 521 U.S. 844.
39. See infra Part IV.
40. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1176 (internal quotation marks
omitted). This is addressed further infra Part IV.A.
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The Ninth Circuit also explained that the degree of protection
that speech receives under the First Amendment varies according to
the expressive interest at stake.41 The spectrum of protection ranges
from highly protected (and by implication highly valued) political
speech, to lesser-protected speech such as commercial speech, and
finally to unprotected speech such as fighting words and obscenity.42
While commercial speech, like the speech in this case, might deserve
less protection, the Ninth Circuit also added that “[t]he specific
circumstances surrounding the speech serve to give context to the
balancing exercise.”43 This means that anonymous online speech
could potentially receive less protection than traditional anonymous
speech simply because the Internet can magnify the harmful effects
of defamatory speech.
Second, the Ninth Circuit addressed the standard for evaluating
mandamus petitions. In granting a petition for a writ of mandamus,
the Ninth Circuit employs a multifactor balancing approach,44
weighing the following five factors:
(1) whether the petitioner has no other means, such as a direct
appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner will
be damaged or prejudiced in any way not correctable on appeal; (3)
whether the district court’s order is clearly erroneous as a matter of
law; (4) whether the district court’s order is an oft repeated error or
manifests a persistent disregard of the federal rules; and (5) whether
the district court’s order raises new and important problems or
issues of first impression.45

Although the court mentioned that each factor is relevant for its
analysis, the court put special emphasis on the third factor—clear
error—which is the only prong that can be dispositive.46 This was
critical to the court’s opinion because the Ninth Circuit ultimately

41. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1173.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1177.
44. The Ninth Circuit first articulated its multi-factor balancing approach to evaluating
mandamus petitions in Bauman. See Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654–55 (9th
Cir. 1977).
45. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1174 (citing Bauman, 557 F.2d at
654–55).
46. Id.
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upheld the district court’s decision after expressly analyzing only the
clear-error factor.47
Finally, after determining the broad standard of review for the
writ-of-mandamus issue, the Ninth Circuit discussed the various
standards that could be applied to determine whether the identities
of anonymous speakers should be disclosed in discovery.48 But the
court ultimately left district courts without clear guidance on which
test is most appropriate, instead suggesting that a vague balancing
test should be used. This test weighs the importance of the
anonymous speech involved (including the nature of the speech)
against the need for relevant discovery.49
The court concluded that although the district court may have
applied the wrong standard to the anonymous speech, its decision
was not the clear error required to grant a writ of mandamus.50 Thus,
the court dodged some of the major issues in the case.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re Anonymous Online Speakers
shows the difficulty of balancing the interests of disclosing
anonymous speakers’ identities (so that a lawsuit can be adjudicated)
with protecting the First Amendment right to anonymous speech.
While this balancing is inherently difficult, the Ninth Circuit made
two errors in its analysis. First, the Ninth Circuit undermined
protections that the Supreme Court had established for anonymous
online speech by suggesting that online anonymity potentially
deserves less protection than traditional anonymity. Second, the
court failed to articulate a clear governing standard to determine
when a court may order the identity of an anonymous online speaker
to be revealed. Despite recognizing the existing split among courts,
the Ninth Circuit avoided taking a side and left the courts within its
jurisdiction without clear guidance. This Note argues that the court
should have made it clear that anonymous online speech is protected
the same as other anonymous speech. The court also should have
adopted the prima-facie-case standard to determine if disclosure of

47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 1177.
Id. at 1175–76.
Id. at 1176.
Id. at 1177.
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an online speaker’s identity was warranted. Alternatively, the court
could have enunciated a clear standard to fully delineate where the
rights of anonymous online speakers lie—thus avoiding the chilling
effects from a multitude of standards.
A. The Ninth Circuit Undermined Anonymous-Online-Speech
Protection
The Supreme Court in Talley v. California originally articulated
the First Amendment protection for anonymous speech.51 That case
involved a city ordinance that prohibited people from distributing
handbills that did not include the speaker’s name and address.52 In
striking down the ordinance, the Court reasoned that a new doctrine
needed to be carved out because “[t]here can be no doubt that such
an identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom to
distribute information and thereby freedom of expression.”53
Arguably, this chilling effect is the primary justification for protecting
anonymous speech.54 The Court does not want to punish speakers
who have an unpopular message by forcing them to personally and
publicly present that message. Granting protection to anonymous
speech certainly has the potential to grant parties a license to express
harmful views without fear of retribution. However, the Court has
decided that the freedom of expression outweighs these concerns.55
Since Talley, the Supreme Court has consistently protected
anonymous speech. For example, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission,56 the Court considered a similar situation to Talley.
Ohio had passed a statute that prohibited people from distributing
anonymous campaign literature.57 When a person seeking to
51. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
52. Id. at 60–61.
53. Id. at 64.
54. See Eric M. Freedman, Reconstructing Journalists’ Privilege, 29 CARDOZO L. REV.
1381, 1382 (2008).
55. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1995) (“The
decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by
concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one’s privacy as
possible. Whatever the motivation may be, . . . the interest in having anonymous works enter
the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure
as a condition of entry.”).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 338 n.8.
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propagate anonymous speech through unsigned leaflets challenged
the law, the Supreme Court affirmed the Talley principles by
extending its holding “beyond the literary realm” to the advocacy of
political causes.58 The Court justified its holding because anonymity
“provides a way for a writer who may be personally unpopular to
ensure that readers will not prejudge her message simply because
they do not like its proponent.”59 By allowing anonymous speech to
retain its protection in contexts beyond the traditional literary realm,
the Court affirmed its commitment to further public dialogue by
allowing ideas to be presented apart from their speaker.
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court has noted that there is
“no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that
should be applied to [online speech].”60 However, the Court
decided that case in the context of regulating pornography on the
Internet; the case did not involve anonymous speech.61 In actuality,
the Court has yet to decide a case relating to anonymous online
speech. However, to further open dialogue and the ongoing vast
discussion of ideas online,62 the Court should be just as willing to
protect anonymous online speech as it is to protect traditional
pamphleteering.63 More people have access to voice their opinions
and spread their ideas if the Court strays far from any chilling effect
that anonymous online speech regulation can have. The Internet
truly offers the opportunity for all speakers to be heard on an equal
ground, regardless of resources. In contrast, anonymous speech
through traditional handbilling and pamphleteering lacks the reach
and general availability that the Internet affords.64 This new medium
for “town criers” and pamphleteers should be celebrated and

58. Id. at 342.
59. Id.
60. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
61. Id.
62. See Jane S. Schacter, Digitally Democratizing Congress? Technology and Political
Accountability, 89 B.U. L. REV. 641 (2009) (discussing the prominence of social media in
political discussions and campaigns).
63. The Court in Reno (early in the Internet’s development) appeared very willing to let
the Internet welcome a new age of easy access to free speech. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 870
(“Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with
a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages,
mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer.”).
64. See Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
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protected—at least as much as speech in traditional mediums—as a
way to further freedom of expression.
The Ninth Circuit implicitly reached the opposite conclusion.
Although the Ninth Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court has
stated (albeit in other contexts) that online speech should not be
treated different from other types of speech, the Ninth Circuit in
Anonymous Online Speakers simultaneously suggested that online
speech might deserve less protection. When discussing whether to
disregard the speakers’ anonymity in this case, the court approvingly
cited the district court’s evaluation of the value of anonymous online
speech:
The district court here appropriately considered the important
value of anonymous speech balanced against a party’s need for
relevant discovery in a civil action. It also recognized the “great
potential for irresponsible, malicious, and harmful communication”
and that particularly in the age of the Internet, the “speed and
power of internet technology makes it difficult for the truth to
‘catch up’ to the lie.”65

The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning undercuts the rationales for free
speech doctrines in general, and the purpose for protecting
anonymous speech in particular. While anonymous online speech is
certainly subject to abuse, the Supreme Court recognized similar
potential in Talley and McIntyre when the rule was being developed
and applied. These harms are balanced out by allowing limited
disclosure of an anonymous speaker’s identity based on the level of
proof available that the speaker’s conduct is actionable.66 Ultimately,
this balancing needs to occur to ensure that anonymous speech has
enough protection that it will not be chilled by unmasking speakers’
identities without sufficient proof of wrongdoing. Further, the
online nature of speech should not be included in this balancing.67

65. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1176 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1214 (D. Nev. 2008)).
66. See Musetta Durkee, Note, The Truth Can Catch the Lie: The Flawed Understanding
of Online Speech in In Re Anonymous Online Speakers, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773, 775
(2011) (“When faced with discovery requests and subpoenas to unmask anonymous speakers’
identities, courts must weigh the harmed parties’ rights to redress against the anonymous
online speakers’ Constitutional rights of speech.”). The various standards that courts have
adopted are discussed infra Part IV.B.
67. See Durkee, supra note 66, at 776 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit . . . mistakenly
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In addition to suggesting that online speech has the potential to
be especially harmful, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the truth
might lag behind a lie in the context of anonymous online speech.68
The court did not attempt to explain why this might be, but the idea
relates to one of the justifications for protecting free speech: the
marketplace of ideas.69 The marketplace of ideas posits that society is
a marketplace where ideas compete for acceptance.70 Some of these
ideas are true and others are false. Ultimately, the good and true
ideas will be sorted out from the lies, and truth will prevail.71 The
Ninth Circuit appears to suggest that when false ideas are propagated
online, the marketplace of ideas is unable to correct itself because the
false ideas can travel quickly in cyberspace. While this concern is
understandable, although not necessarily correct,72 the alternative is
to blot out the speaker’s opinion from the beginning. It is better to
accept any potentially undesirable lag in the marketplace of ideas,
which still functions online, than to censor speakers in the name of
truth. The Ninth Circuit was incorrect to suggest that the nature of
online speech, particularly as it relates to the marketplace of ideas,
should be factored in to deprive anonymous online speakers of
adequate protection for their ideas.
As a concluding thought, it is entirely possible that the Ninth
Circuit did not intend to approvingly cite the district court’s
reasoning to suggest that online speech is less deserving of
protection. Hopefully, the Ninth Circuit actually disagreed with the
reasoning of the district court. However, the Ninth Circuit’s
language was sufficiently ambiguous that it could still have serious
chilling effects on anonymous online speech. If the Ninth Circuit
disagreed with the decision of the district court, the court easily

characterized the online nature of the defendant’s speech as a separate factor in the . . .
balancing test, finding that the allegedly harmful speech occurred on the Internet inherently
weighed against the anonymous speaker.”).
68. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1176.
69. Cf. Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69
ANTITRUST L.J. 249, 249 (2001).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See MADELEINE SCHACHTER & JOEL LAURENCE KURTZBERG, LAW OF INTERNET
SPEECH 454 (3d ed. 2008) (“[T]he recipients of [offensive online] statements do not
necessarily attribute the same level of credence to the statements that they would accord to
statements made in other contexts.”).
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could have made clear that the district court was incorrect. Also, the
court could have chosen not to restate the district court’s reasoning.
Instead, by quoting the district court’s reasoning without additional
commentary and by upholding the district court’s decision, the
Ninth Circuit appeared to approve and perpetuate the district court’s
flawed reasoning, which undermines protections given to
anonymous online speech.
B. Chilling Standards for Anonymous Online Speech
One of the keys to making our laws effective is to give them a
semblance of consistency that will allow individuals to confidently
order their behavior around those laws.73 In the First Amendment
context, consistent laws are especially important to ensure that
protected speech is not “chilled,” as when people overly restrict their
own expression to ensure they will not be punished. The Supreme
Court has gone to great lengths to establish this principle.74 The
Court has generally adopted flexible balancing tests over bright-line
rules in the First Amendment context to ensure that the law does not
unintentionally silence protected speech; this approach allows the
free speech doctrine to grow and change as society needs.75 But
courts that have applied these principles in the anonymous speech
context have gone on to adopt a number of different approaches that
are far from consistent and only as flexible as the individual judge’s
policy preferences permit.
In In re Anonymous Online Speakers, the Ninth Circuit
considered the state of the law in various jurisdictions before
announcing the standard it would use to determine whether interests
in discovering a speaker’s identity outweighed that speaker’s
73. Kaimipono David Wenger, Reparations Within the Rule of Law, 29 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 231, 242 (2007) (extolling the benefits of the rule of law).
74. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340–41 (1974) (relating that
speech restrictions must clear certain requirements so that protected speech will not be selfcensored).
75. See, e.g., Terry Nicole Steinberg, Rival Union Access to Public Employees: A New First
Amendment Balancing Test, 2 GEO. MASON L. REV. 361, 361 (1994) (discussing the Court’s
balancing test to reconcile the “tensions between the First Amendment and labor relations in
the public sector”); Anthony N. Moshirnia, Note, The Pickering Paper Shield: The Erosion of
Public School Teachers’ First Amendment Rights Jeopardizes the Quality of Public Education, 16
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 313, 320 (2007) (discussing the Court’s Pickering balancing test for public
employees’ First Amendment rights to free expression).
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anonymous speech interests.76 This section shows the confusion
resulting from the various standards that courts have used. Despite
recognizing this split in opinion among courts, the Ninth Circuit
failed to adopt one of the standards to clear up some confusion.
As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, the least-protective courts have
declined to create or adopt a new standard for anonymous online
speech. Instead, they have used only traditional state discovery rules
to determine whether anonymous speakers’ identities should be
disclosed.77 The virtue of taking this approach is that it minimizes
the number of potentially applicable standards (and possible
confusion) in an anonymous speech case, and arguably, traditional
discovery rules could protect the same interests.78 However,
anonymous speech is of such importance that it deserves separate
protection and a consistent standard to protect it. Allowing each
state’s discovery rules to govern the disclosure of anonymous
speakers’ identities could create so many different standards that
speech could be chilled out of fear that another state’s laws might
leave the anonymous utterance unprotected.
The next step up from no separate protection is to evaluate the
speech and discovery interests under the “motion to dismiss or good
faith standard.”79 While this standard may be clearer than developing
a new standard, its low bar for protecting the identities of
anonymous online speakers presents a significant risk of chilling
anonymous speech. Although the anonymous speaker will retain the
opportunity to challenge the lawsuit on its merits and may still
prevail on freedom of expression grounds, disclosing the speaker’s
identity to her accusers results in irreversible damage. Thus, a
standard set so low would invite frivolous litigation designed solely
to discover the identities of anonymous speakers.

76. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1176.
77. Id. at 1175 (citing Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg & Ellers, LLP v. JPA Dev.,
Inc., No. 0425, 2006 WL 37020, at *8 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Jan. 4, 2006)).
78. See Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking “John Doe” Defendants: The Case Against Excessive
Hand-Wringing over Legal Standards, 83 OR. L. REV. 795, 801 (2004).
79. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1175 (citing Columbia Ins. Co. v.
seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999); see also In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to
Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26 (2000), rev’d on other grounds, Am. Online v. Anonymous
Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001)).
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Some courts have adopted a standard that is higher than the
motion-to-dismiss standard but lower than the prima-facie-case
standard.80 Although this exact standard avoids clear classification
and arguably provides more protection than the motion-to-dismiss
standard, a lack of guidelines makes this standard somewhat arbitrary
and unable to adequately protect anonymous speakers’ rights.
The next clear standard appears to be the prima-facie-case
standard.81 Under this approach, the plaintiff must make out a
“prima facie showing of the claim for which the plaintiff seeks the
disclosure of the anonymous speaker’s identity.”82 This standard is
adequate to protect anonymous online speech and is the standard
that the Ninth Circuit should have adopted for cases that do not
involve political speech. The prima-facie-case standard requires
sufficient evidence of wrongdoing to support a cause of action but
also does not require as much evidence as a motion for summary
judgment. By using the prima-facie-case standard appropriately, the
court can balance the interests in free expression against the need to
discover online speakers’ identities. The court does so with the
balance in favor of the anonymous speaker but without being too
exacting to allow truly defamatory speech to go unpunished.
Finally, the standard that the district court in Quixtar Inc. v.
Signature Management Team, LLC adopted is the most exacting
standard that courts have applied.83 This standard, established by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Doe v. Cahill,84 “requires plaintiffs to be
able to survive a hypothetical motion for summary judgment and
give, or attempt to give, notice to the speaker before discovering the
anonymous speaker’s identity.”85 Requiring such a high standard
merely to obtain the identity of an opposing party may seem
excessive; however, the Ninth Circuit was quick to point out that
80. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1176 (citing Sedersten v. Taylor,
No. 09-3031-CV-S-GAF, 2009 WL 4802567 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2009); Enterline v. Pocono
Med. Ctr., 751 F. Supp. 2d 782 (M.D. Pa. 2008); Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp.
2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001)).
81. Id. at 1175.
82. Id. (citing Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D. Conn. 2008); Highfields
Capital Mgmt., LP v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Sony Music Entm’t, Inc.
v. Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
83. Id.
84. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
85. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d at 1176.
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such an exacting standard was justified in Cahill because political
speech (which receives increased First Amendment protection) was at
issue in that case.86 Additionally, because the Supreme Court has
already accepted that the anonymous speech doctrine leaves some
misbehavior unpunished, this high standard is appropriate when the
speech’s value is especially high, such as it is with political speech.
However, to require such a strong showing in other situations would
overbalance free speech interests against the legitimate need for
disclosure.
Evaluating each of these standards separately demonstrates that
each has significant weaknesses in its application. However, given the
nature of the speech at issue in this case, the Ninth Circuit should
have adopted the prima-facie-case standard because it best balances
the importance of anonymous online speech against the lesser
interest in disclosure.
Rather than adopt the prima-facie-case standard, the Ninth
Circuit made the mistake of not adopting any standard at all. Even
conclusively adopting a lesser standard would have been preferred
because it would have provided more protection than the current
hodgepodge of standards. Allowing judges the discretion to choose
between competing standards only exacerbates the problem. A judge
who favors full civil discovery, or one who is critical of the potentially
malicious nature of anonymous online speech, will tend to choose a
lesser standard. When individuals do not know what standard will
apply to their anonymous online speech, they will not know where
their First Amendment protections lie. As such, speakers who are
conscious of the law might stay far from the dividing line of
protected and unprotected speech, which has the potential to chill
fully protected speech. This harm can be corrected only by
announcing a single standard to decide when anonymous online
speakers’ identities will be protected. The Ninth Circuit passed up a
good opportunity to be the first circuit court to announce a solid
standard on this issue. Instead, the Ninth Circuit has advanced the
confusion and virtually ensured that this problem will remain until
the Supreme Court can conclusively resolve it.

86. Id. at 1176–77.
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V. CONCLUSION
Anonymous speech has been a historically protected right under
the First Amendment. It has been justified as a way to avoid
potential chilling effects on freedom of expression and a way to allow
unpopular speakers to speak without having others prejudge their
message based on who they are. The Internet has increased the use
and value of anonymous speech by allowing all people the
opportunity to speak their minds without disclosing their identities.
With this expansion in online speech, modern courts have been left
with the challenge to balance the need for disclosure of anonymous
speakers’ identities against the chilling effect that such disclosure has.
Courts have attempted to tackle these problems but have created
a hodgepodge of inconsistent standards that have a distinct chilling
effect beyond what a single standard would necessarily provide. The
Ninth Circuit’s recent opinion in In re Anonymous Online Speakers
has only added to the confusion. Rather than extend Supreme Court
precedent to grant equal protection to anonymous speech both
online and offline, the Ninth Circuit has suggested that anonymous
online speech may be less deserving of protection. If not contrary to
the Supreme Court’s command, the Ninth Circuit’s decision is
certainly contrary to the policies underlying the First Amendment
and the anonymous speech doctrine.
Further, the Ninth Circuit has failed to announce a workable
solution to balance anonymous speech interests against interests in
disclosing speaker identity. The Ninth Circuit should have adopted
the prima-facie-case standard, which provides a good balance but still
favors protecting anonymous online speech. Rather, the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion has given little guidance to district courts. Each
court may create its own standards, based upon its judge’s personal
preferences, awaiting eventual Supreme Court intervention to
provide a clear standard. Overall, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion has
greatly added to the chilling effects that encumber this area of First
Amendment law.
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